The Impact of Foreign Aid on Development and Aggregate Welfare in Developing Countries by Kumler \u2707, Todd J.
Illinois Wesleyan University
Digital Commons @ IWU
Honors Projects Economics Department
2007
The Impact of Foreign Aid on Development and
Aggregate Welfare in Developing Countries
Todd J. Kumler '07
Illinois Wesleyan University
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by The Ames Library, the Andrew W. Mellon Center for Curricular and Faculty
Development, the Office of the Provost and the Office of the President. It has been accepted for inclusion in Digital Commons @ IWU by
the faculty at Illinois Wesleyan University. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@iwu.edu.
©Copyright is owned by the author of this document.
Recommended Citation
Kumler '07, Todd J., "The Impact of Foreign Aid on Development and Aggregate Welfare in Developing Countries" (2007).
Honors Projects. Paper 19.
http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/econ_honproj/19
The Impact of Foreign Aid on Development and
 
Aggregate Welfare in Developing Countries
 
Todd J. Kumler
 
Honors Research
 
Illinois Wesleyan University
 
Haria Ossella-Durbal, Advisor
 
April 27, 2007
 
Abstract: Over one billion people across the globe live in extreme poverty, struggling to survive 
on less than one U.S. dollar per day. The persistently low levels of aggregate welfare and human 
development in developing countries have recently caught the attention of many politicians and 
social observers. As the developed nations and multinational organizations ofthe world are 
called upon to increase development assistance to these impoverished countries, a question must 
be asked: Will increased foreign aid effectively raise human development in developing 
countries? While many studies have analyzed the impact of development aid on economic 
growth in developing nations, few have addressed the impact of development aid on more 
comprehensive areas of development. Analyzing data on 87 developing countries from 1980 to 
2000, this study employs two-stage least squares estimation to evaluate the impact of foreign aid 
on the Human Development Index (HOI), a composite index of development and aggregate 
welfare, while controlling for the level of pro-poor public expenditure within a developing 
country. In addition, an interaction term between foreign aid and a measure of macroeconomic 
policies is utilized to determine if economic policy has an impact on the effectiveness of 
development assistance. This study finds that greater foreign aid is associated with lower levels 
of HDI after controlling for GDP and pro-poor public expenditure. In addition, the study 
concludes that macroeconomic policies do not influence the level ofHOI in developing 
countries. 
I. Introduction 
Individuals living in extreme poverty face some of the most severe conditions 
imaginable: hunger, epidemic disease, illiteracy, poor sanitation, lack of education, unclean 
drinking water, and more. For inhabitants of the developed world, these circumstances are barely 
comprehensible; but for millions of people living in developing countries, a bleak subsistence is 
a daily reality. In 2003, approximately 1.1 billion people across the globe survived on less than 
one dollar per day (in PPP-adjusted US dollars), while an additional 1.6 billion people lived on 
less than two dollars per day. Nearly 50.5 percent of the world's population live in extreme 
poverty as measured by the international poverty line of two dollars per day (World Bank, 2007). 
As Figure 1 illustrates, extreme poverty persists throughout the world, although it is unequally 
concentrated in South Asia, East Asia and the Pacific, and Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Figure 1: Regional Distribution of Extreme Poverty in 2003 
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While many individual countries and international organizations have attempted to 
reduce extreme poverty and promote development worldwide, the Millennium Summit in 
September 2000 brought together 191 nations in an effort to jointly develop an ambitious 
roadmap to improve the lives of individuals living in extreme deprivation. The resultant sense of 
urgency in fighting poverty and promoting development was reflected in the adoption ofthe 
Millennium Development Goals, which laid out eight large-scale objectives for reducing human 
indigence over the next fifteen years (Gilbert, 2004). First and foremost among these objectives 
was to halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion ofpeople living on less than one U.S. 
dollar per day. 
While policy makers have devised various strategies for achieving the comprehensive 
targets of the Millennium Development Goals, one approach which has received increasing 
attention among policy analysts and the media is to increase foreign aid. In March 2002, for 
instance, over fifty heads of state and 200 other high level officials met in Monterrey, Mexico at 
a UN conference on financing development. During the conference, developed nations agreed to 
increase their level of official development assistance to 0.7 percent ofGDP. Following this 
conference, President George W. Bush also announced the creation of a new project, the 
Millennium Challenge Account, which would provide 10 billion dollars in aid over the next three 
years to developing countries who practice good governance. 
Other public figures have also pushed for an increase in foreign aid to developing 
countries. Rock star Bono ofU2, working closely with economist Jeffrey Sachs, has called on 
developed countries to increase aid to low-income nations. Moreover, many celebrities have lent 
their assistance to the ONE campaign, which lobbies the U.S. Congress to increase development 
aid by one percent of the federal u.s. budget. 
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With this recent push for increasing foreign aid, it is important to ask whether or not 
development assistance actually impacts the level of development in low-income countries. 
Numerous studies have examined the effect of foreign aid on growth rates in developing nations. 
However, economic growth does not necessarily lead to a reduction in extreme poverty levels, 
and few studies have actually looked at foreign aid's effect on poverty rates or human 
development. Since cross-country data on poverty rates over time are extremely sparse and often 
incomparable, measures of aggregate human welfare, such as the Human Development Index 
(HDI), can be used to determine the impact of development aid on the livelihood of the poor 
(Gomanee, Morrissey, Mosley, and Verschoor, 2005 p. 355). Welfare measures are likely to be 
correlated to levels of poverty in developing countries, and foreign aid is often aimed at reducing 
poverty by improving human development. Thus, this study will examine whether foreign aid 
has been effective in raising the level ofhuman development and aggregate welfare, as measured 
by the HDI, within developing countries. 
This study proceeds as follows. Section II reviews previous literature on the impact of 
foreign aid to developing countries. Section III develops an empirical model for analyzing the 
effect of foreign aid on overall development, while Section IV describes the data utilized in this 
study. Section V discusses the results of the empirical model, and Section VI provides 
conclusions and suggests possible policy implications. 
II. Literature Review 
A. Aid's Impact on Economic Growth 
Numerous studies since the 1960s have attempted to determine empirically the effect of 
foreign aid on economic growth in developing countries. Prior to the late-1990s, such studies 
were hindered by inadequate data and econometric specification problems. Many studies, for 
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instance, were hampered by reverse causality, which portrays a negative impact between aid and 
growth rates since more aid is typically given to poorer countries (Easterly, 2003 p. 26). The 
literature examining the impact ofaid on growth was rejuvenated, however, with the publication 
of the paper "Aid, Policies, and Growth" by World Bank economists Craig Burnside and David 
Dollar (2000, henceforth BD). Using data on development aid from a new World Bank database, 
BD analyze the effect of foreign aid on economic growth rates for 56 developing countries over 
four-year time intervals spanning from 1970 to 1993. Unlike previous studies which simply 
analyze the impact of aid on growth, the BD model includes an interaction term between foreign 
aid and an index ofmacroeconomic policies in order to determine if aid's impact on economic 
growth is affected by a country's macroeconomic policies. 
To mitigate the problem of reverse causality, BD employ a two-stage least squares 
(2SLS) estimation technique. This technique controls for the endogeneity of aid by first 
regressing aid against several explanatory variables and then regressing growth in GDP against 
the predicted values of aid from the first equation along with other independent variables. Thus, 
BD develop two equations: one which estimates foreign aid based on national income coupled 
with an index ofmacroeconomic policy variables and several variables representing the recipient 
country's strategic importance to donating countries, and a second which predicts growth rates 
based on foreign aid along with an index ofmacroeconomic policy variables, an interaction 
between policy and aid, and a vector ofcontrol variables (such as ethnic fractionalization, 
education, etc.). 
From their study, BD initially determine that aid by itself is insignificant in creating 
economic growth. However, when the authors include the aid*policy interaction term, the aid 
variable remains insignificant while the interaction term becomes significantly positive. This 
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result holds under several different specifications, including when ordinary-least squares 
regression technique is used (so that aid is treated as exogenous), as well as when only lower­
income countries are considered. BD hence conclude that foreign aid can promote economic 
growth, but only in countries already engaged in pro-growth macroeconomic policies, such as 
low inflation, government budget surpluses, and openness to trade. 
Although the publication ofBD's influential paper prompted a renewed focus on the 
effect of foreign aid on economic growth in developing countries, many economists published 
studies questioning the robustness ofBD's results. One line of criticism which probes the 
robustness ofBD's findings focuses on the data employed by BD. Using the same econometric 
model as BD, William Easterly, Ross Levine, and David Roodman (2003) add more countries to 
BD's dataset while also extending the data to 1997. They find that the aid*policy interaction 
variable becomes negative and insignificant, indicating that good economic policies do not 
engender more growth for donor aid. Furthermore, many note that BD's results rest on the 
exclusion of five outliers which have a significant impact on the coefficient of the aid*policy 
interaction term. If alternative methods are used to exclude statistical outliers for the aid*policy 
variable as well as outliers for other variables, while keeping the same data and econometric 
model as BD, the results indicate that aid alone can have a positive, significant impact on 
economic growth, regardless ofpro-growth macroeconomic policies (Dalgaard and Hansen, 
2001 p. 33). 
Other economists question whether altering the definitions of the variables used in BD's 
model impacts the conclusion that aid increases economic growth in countries with good 
economic policies. Easterly (2003) finds that the significance ofBD's aid*policy interaction 
term is affected when the definitions of foreign aid, good economic policies, or economic growth 
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are modified. For instance, by including variables such as the black market premium, the ratio of 
money supply to GDP, or the change in trade-to-GDP ratio in the economic policy index, the 
interaction between foreign aid and policy becomes insignificant (Easterly, 2003). In contrast, . 
BD's original results are confirmed when other definitions ofgood policy, such as the World 
Bank's Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (a broad measure ofpolicies composed of 
20 different components ranging from macroeconomic reforms and structural policies to policies 
of social inclusion and public sector management), are utilized in a model similar to that ofBD 
(Collier and Dollar, 2001, 2002). 
Controlling for factors beyond those considered by BD also impacts their results. Carl­
Johan Dalgaard, Hemik Hansen, and Finn Tarp (2004) find that aid by itself does have a 
significant impact on economic growth when controlling for the fraction of a country located 
within the tropics. However, the effect decreases as the proportion of tropical landmass 
increases. Controlling for cross-country heterogeneity also shows that aid alone, regardless of 
macroeconomic policies, can stimulate growth. When Shuang Lu and Rati Ram (2001) include 
country-specific fixed effects dummy intercepts, they find that the aid*policy interaction term 
becomes negative and insignificant under these conditions, while the aid term becomes 
significant and positive. Patrick Guillaumont and Lisa Chauvet (2001) consider the possibility 
that aid effectiveness depends on the environment in the recipient country. Including an 
interaction variable between external and climatic shocks (such as terms of trade and real value 
of exports shocks) and aid, as well as a variable for external and climatic shocks alone, 
Guillaumont and Chauvet (2001) find that while aid is not more effective in countries with good 
macroeconomic policies, foreign assistance is more successful in producing economic growth in 
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countries vulnerable to environmental shocks. Guillawnont and Chauvet (2001) thus argue that 
aid should be targeted toward countries in danger of climatic or external shocks. 
Another criticism of the BD model is that BD only control for the endogeneity of foreign 
aid while treating other variables as exogenous. Although BD assert that specification tests 
indicate that only aid is endogenous to the model, many researchers (e.g. Guillawnont and 
Chauvet (2001), Hansen and Tarp (2001), Hudson and Mosley (2001» argue that variables such 
as inflation and budget deficits may also be endogenous to the model. Studies by Guillaumont 
and Chauvet (2001) and Hansen and Tarp (2001) indicate that when economic policy variables 
are treated as endogenous, aid increases growth regardless of the macroeconomic policies within 
a country. 
Critics also note that BD model the nonlinear relationship between aid and growth only 
through the introduction of an aid*policy interaction variable. Economic theory does not provide 
definitive evidence for including the aid*policy interaction in the model while excluding other 
interaction terms or squared terms (Hansen and Tarp, 2001 p. 550). In fact, nwnerous studies 
choose to include an aid squared term in addition to the aid*policy interaction term to test for 
diminishing marginal returns to aid (e.g. Dalgaard and Hansen, 2001; Hansen and Tarp, 2001; 
Lensink and White, 2001; Collier and Dollar 2001,2002). Many of these studies find the aid 
squared term to be significantly negative. Moreover, Robert Lensink and Howard White (2001) 
even hypothesize the existence of an "aid Laffer curve," in which after a certain point, foreign 
aid causes economic growth to decline. 
B. Aid's Impact on Consumption. Investment and Poverty 
While the majority of studies on aid effectiveness focus on economic growth, like BD's 
research, some economists have looked at the impact of development assistance on other 
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macroeconomic variables in developing countries. Peter Boone (1996) finds that foreign aid only 
increases consumption and does not increase investment in low-income countries. He estimates 
that nearly three quarters ofdevelopment assistance finances public consumption while the other 
quarter finances private consumption. Similarly, Easterly (1999) illustrates that during the period 
from 1965 to 1995, foreign aid increases investment in only six out of the 88 developing 
countries he includes in his study. He further shows that increased investment, regardless of 
source, only triggers a significant increase in economic growth in four out ofthe 88 countries. 
These findings suggest that foreign aid does not stimulate investment, which in tum should spur 
long-term growth, as is typically intended by aid donors. In addition, this conclusion indicates 
that foreign aid is highly fungible so that targeting specific projects is difficult when distributing 
development aid. 
More recent studies have also looked at the impact of foreign aid on extreme poverty in 
developing countries. Collier and Dollar (2001,2002) argue that foreign aid reduces poverty by 
increasing economic growth. Therefore, the authors first estimate aid's impact on income per 
capita in a model similar to the BD model. Like BD, the authors find that aid is effective in 
promoting economic growth in countries with pro-growth macroeconomic policies. Collier and 
Dollar (2001,2002) then develop a theoretical model to determine a poverty-efficient aid 
allocation rule which maximizes poverty reduction given a certain level of aid. From this model, 
they find that aid's impact on poverty depends on a country's initial level ofpoverty, its 
elasticity ofpoverty with respect to income, and its macroeconomic policies. Collier and Dollar 
(2001,2002) assume that the elasticity ofpoverty with respect to per capita income, or the 
amount by which poverty decreases when per capita income increases, is constant at two. This 
value for the elasticity is taken from previous studies, which indicate that the mean elasticity 
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across a large sample of countries is equal to two. Collier and Dollar (2001,2002) argue that the 
poverty-efficient aid allocation rule illustrates that aid should be redirected to countries with 
good economic policies and higher poverty rates, ceteris paribus, until the marginal productivity 
of aid in decreasing poverty is equalized across countries. The authors estimate that by allocating 
foreign aid in this way, an additional 9.1 million people could be lifted out of poverty. 
While development aid may spur poverty alleviation by promoting economic growth, 
others argue that aid could impact the level ofpoverty within a country through channels other 
than growth. Paul Mosley, John Hudson, and AIjan Verschoor (2004) contend that aid can 
impact poverty directly (for instance, through projects aimed at raising the incomes of 
individuals living below the poverty line), through growth, or by influencing the elasticity of 
poverty with respect to growth. Additionally, the authors hypothesize that pro-poor expenditure 
(PPE), such as expenditure on healthcare, education, water and sanitation, rural roads, and 
agriculture, can impact the elasticity of poverty with respect to growth. Because of the multiple 
mechanisms by which aid affects poverty, the authors attempt to estimate the impact of aid on 
poverty while treating aid, poverty (measured by the headcount index of the number ofpeople 
living on less than one US dollar per day), and PPE as endogenous. Mosley, Hudson, and 
Verschoor (2004), therefore, utilize the generalized method ofmoments (GMM) technique to 
simultaneously estimate three equations, one for each of the endogenous variables. From this 
model, the authors determine that aid not only has a significant, negative impact on poverty, but 
that donor assistance also increases PPE in countries with low initial incomes. They further find 
from the regression relating poverty to per capita income and the PPE index that the elasticity of 
poverty with respect to income across all countries receiving aid is 0.48, which is significantly 
lower than the elasticity oftwo assumed by Collier and Dollar (2001,2002). 
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C. Aid's Impact on HDI 
Since data availability on poverty is relatively sparse, few studies look directly at the 
influence of foreign aid on poverty measures. However, several studies do address the impact of 
donor assistance on development and welfare, as measured by such indicators as the Human 
Development Index (HDI), literacy rates, or infant mortality rates. These measures are highly 
correlated with the level ofpoverty in developing countries and may even be superior to income 
measures ofpoverty, which do not consider the nonmonetary factors ofbeing poor (Gomanee, 
Morrissey, Mosely, and Verschoor, 2005 p. 356). When controlling for the level ofPPE in 
recipient countries, Karuna Gomanee, Oliver Morrissey, Mosely, and Verschoor (2005) show 
that foreign aid can increase HDI levels and reduce infant mortality rates. The authors construct a 
weighted PPE index to capture the impact of each category of expenditure (education, 
healthcare, and sanitation, housing, and water) on infant mortality rates and HDI. Gomanee, 
Morrissey, Mosley, and Verschoor (2005) then use OLS estimation to regress the two different 
measures of aggregate welfare against the PPE index, per capita income, government military 
expenditure, and foreign aid for 104 countries from 1980 to 2000. The authors determine that 
although the PPE index does not significantly impact either measure ofwelfare, aid itself directly 
influences HDI and infant mortality rates. 
Gomanee, Girma, and Morrissey (2003) also develop a similar empirical model looking 
at the effect of development aid, PPE, and military spending on HDI and infant mortality rates. 
However, they appeal to quantile regression techniques rather than OLS in order to determine if 
the impact on aid differs based on a country's level of initial welfare. While the level of PPE is 
determined to have a positive impact on both measures ofwelfare when controlling for initial 
welfare, the authors confirm Gomanee, Morrissey, Mosley, and Verschoor's (2005) result that 
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aid increases HDI and decreases infant mortality rates in recipient countries. Oomanee, Oirma, 
and Morrissey (2003) further find that foreign aid and PPE are more effective at improving both 
measures ofwelfare in countries with low initial levels of aggregate welfare. 
Nadia Masud and Boriana Yontcheva (2005), on the other hand, analyze the impact of 
different types of aid on infant mortality and literacy rates. The authors consider two different 
sources of aid-bilateral aid and aid donated by European NODs-to determine if these different 
types of assistance have similar impacts on infant mortality and literacy rates. The results of this 
analysis are mixed: while neither type of aid influences literacy rates, NOD aid significantly 
decreases infant mortality in recipient countries (Masud and Yontcheva, 2005). Thus, it is 
important to recognize that the type of aid, whether bilateral, multilateral, or NOD generated, 
may influence the effectiveness of the assistance. 
As can be seen, many studies have analyzed the effectiveness of foreign aid in 
developing countries. While BD find that foreign aid can promote economic growth in nations 
which possess pro-growth economic policies, studies since the publication ofBD's seminal 
paper have found a wide array ofresults, ranging from aid being ineffective in all policy 
environments to aid being effective regardless of the policy environment. These papers 
demonstrate that BD's results are not robust when alternative definitions ofpolicies and aid are 
utilized, when additional control variables are added to the model, when other variables in the 
model are treated endogenously, or when further nonlinear terms are included. Since ODP 
growth does not necessarily improve the quality of life for all citizens in a developing country, 
several authors have extended the BD model to explore the impact of aid on extreme poverty, 
aggregate welfare, and human development. Many of these studies find that foreign aid is 
effective in increasing aggregate welfare and human development. However, none of the studies 
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consider whether development assistance has a greater impact on welfare and development in 
countries with pro-growth macroeconomic policies. In addition, only one study controls for the 
endogeneity of foreign aid when analyzing the impact of foreign aid on extreme poverty or 
aggregate welfare. 
This study, in fact, seeks to extend the previous literature looking at the effect of foreign 
aid on aggregate welfare by considering the impact ofmacroeconomics policies and the 
endogeneity of foreign aid. A policy index (similar to BD's index) is thus considered in order to 
control for the effect ofmacroeconomic policies on HDI. This policy index is also interacted 
with foreign aid to create an aid*policy interaction term to determine ifmacroeconomic policy 
has an impact on the effectiveness of development assistance in improving HDI. In addition, this 
research will utilize 2SLS in order to ascertain if foreign aid continues to increase aggregate 
welfare and human development when aid is treated as endogenous. 
III. Empirical Model 
Previous studies have used a variety ofmeasures to capture the impact of aid on levels of 
development. The most frequently utilized statistic for human development (Gomanee, Girma, 
and Morrissey (2003); Mosley, Hudson, and Verschoor (2004); and Gomanee, Morrissey, 
Mosley, and Verschoor (2005)) is HDI, or the Human Development Index, which is published 
annually in the United Nations Development Program's Human Development Report. HDI offers 
a more comprehensive measure ofwelfare and development in comparison to GDP per capita 
because it considers school enrollment, literacy rates, and life expectancy, in addition to GDP per 
capita. Specifically, HDI is an average of GDP per capita, education levels (measured by a 
weighted average of school enrollment and literacy rates), and life expectancy for each country 
(Appendix I details exactly how HDI is calculated). While income measures, such as the 
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headcount index, could be utilized to quantify extreme poverty or welfare in developing 
countries, these measures are not widely available over time and do not consider the 
nonmonetary aspects ofbeing poor. HDI, on the other hand, considers non-pecuniary factors of 
poverty, such as life expectancy and school enrollment, and thus provides a better measure of 
overall poverty. 
Although difficulties exist when comparing a country's total welfare with that of its 
poorest citizens, poverty levels are likely to be lower in countries with higher levels of HDI; and 
measures aimed at increasing HDI are likely to improve the livelihood of those living in poverty 
(Gomanee, Morrissey, Mosley, and Verschoor 2005 p. 356). Because previous research 
indicates that aid can increase a nation's HDI through a variety of channels--both directly, such 
as when foreign aid finances projects aimed at providing greater access to public healthcare or 
education (Gomanee, Morrissey, Mosley, and Verschoor 2005 p. 356), and indirectly, such as 
when aid contributes to economic growth or boosts the level ofgovernment expenditure on 
sectors benefiting the poor (Mosley, Hudson, and Verschoor, 2004 p. 221), these variables need 
to be considered in order to determine the impact offoreign assistance on HDI. 
A. Controlling for Initial Income 
Like the model employed by Gomanee, Morrissey, Mosley, and Verschoor (2005), 
GDPO/capitait is included in the model in order to control for initial income per capita. This 
variable represents constant dollar GDP per capita for country i in the year preceding the start of 
time period t. By considering income per capita in the year preceding the start of the time period, 
the model controls for the effect ofGDP on HDI since any aid disbursement could increase GDP 
in the current time period. Because an increase in per capita income directly increases aggregate 
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welfare in developing countries, real GDP per capita is predicted to have a positive impact on 
HDI. 
B. Controlling for Pro-Poor Expenditure 
Aggregate welfare in a country can also be impacted by the level of government spending 
on various social sectors. This study, therefore, follows the works ofMosley, Hudson, and 
Verschoor (2004), Gomanee, Girma, and Morrissey (2004), and Gomanee, Morrissey, Mosley, 
and Verschoor (2005) by controlling for the level of government pro-poor expenditure (PPE) in a 
developing country. These previous studies indicate that certain sectors of public spending 
increase aggregate welfare, especially for the most impoverished citizens (Gomanee, Morrissey, 
Mosley, and Verschoor, 2005 p 357). Expenditures on health, education, and sanitation are 
particularly likely to raise aggregate welfare since these three sectors are most closely linked to 
the measures included in HDI (Gomanee, Morrissey, Mosley, and Verschoor, 2005 p 358). Thus, 
greater PPE within a country should be positively correlated with HDI. In order to measure the 
various expenditures that comprise PPE, Gomanee, Girma, and Morrissey (2004) and Gomanee, 
Morrissey, Mosley, and Verschoor (2005) create two PPE indexes. First, the authors construct an 
unweighted pro-poor expenditure index, UPPE/GDP, which is the sum of expenditure on health, 
expenditure on education, and expenditure on housing, sanitation, and water, all taken as a 
percentage of GDP. Thus, 
(1) UPPE/GDP = Ph/GDP + PelGDP + P/GDP 
where Ph/GDP is government expenditure on health relative to GDP, PelGDP is government 
expenditure on education relative to GDP, and P/GDP is government expenditure on housing, 
sanitation, and water relative to GDP. 
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Although the UPPE/GDP index is simple to construct, it assumes that the three 
rcomponents have an equal impact on aggregate welfare. This assumption, as Gomanee, 
IMo!Tissey, Mosley, and Verschoor (2005) demonstrate, is empirically false. The authors thus 
create a second index, BPPE/GDP, which uses beta-weights in order to capture the relative 
impact of the three expenditure categories on HDI. These beta-weights are determined from a 
regression of HDI on expenditures on health, education, and housing, sanitation, and water l . 
Once the beta-weights are determined, the index is computed according to equation (2): 
(2) BPPE/GDP= ~hPh/GDP + ~ePJGDP + ~sPJGDP. 
It has also been argued that foreign aid is often utilized to finance greater pro-poor 
expenditure by recipient governments. PPE, therefore, could be a function of aid, and including 
both PPE and Aid as control variables in explaining HDI may lead to double counting of foreign 
aid (Gomanee, Morrissey, Mosley, and Verschoor, 2005 p. 360). To overcome this problem, this 
study follows the methodology of Gomanee, Morrissey, Mosley, and Verschoor (2005) by 
constructing a generated regressor to "strip out" aid from the PPE indices. This method separates 
pro-poor expenditure funded by foreign aid from pro-poor expenditure funded by other sources 
of government revenue. More specifically, each PPE index (UPPE/GDP and BPPE/GDP) is 
regressed against aid, and then the residuals of each equation are saved as two new variables, 
UPPEres/GDP and BPPEreJGDP. Like the paper by Gomanee, Morrissey, Mosley, and Verschoor 
(2005), this study will consider each of the four indices, UPPE/GDP, BPPE/GDP, UPPEreJGDP, 
and BPPEres/GDP, in order to control for the level ofpro-poor government spending in 
developing countries and to test the robustness of the results depending on the PPE index 
utilized. Each is predicted to have a positive impact on a country's HDI. 
1 The beta-weight for an expenditure category is calculated by multiplying the regression coefficient for that
 
expenditure category by the standard deviation of the expenditure category and then dividing by the standard
 
deviation ofHDI.
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c. Controlling for Macroeconomic Policies 
The economic growth literature indicates that several macroeconomic policy variables 
can impact growth rates in developing countries. Since growth leads to increases in HDI levels, 
any variable which raises growth should similarly improve aggregate welfare and development. 
This study, thus, includes an index ofmacroeconomic policy variables to reflect the quality of 
policies within a developing country. The creation of this index follows from BD, who include 
three variables in their policy index. First, the inflation rate is included as a measure of a 
country's monetary policy. As is standard in the literature, the inflation rate is measured as the 
natural logarithm of one plus the inflation rate. BD also include government budget surplus (or 
deficit) relative to GDP in order to evaluate the quality of a country's fiscal policy. Finally, they 
consider trade openness to see how well a country is integrated into international markets. In 
their study, BD utilize a dichotomous variable developed by Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner 
in which zero represents a closed economy and one represents an open economy. Unfortunately, 
the Sachs and Warner measure could not be included in this study due to data availability, so 
total trade volume (exports plus imports) relative to GDP is used as an alternative measure of 
openness. This variable is frequently utilized to reflect openness, and Easterly (2003) employs it 
as a substitute for the Sachs and Warner measure in creating his policy index. 
While BD consider several techniques for combining the three macroeconomic indicators 
into one policy index, they conclude that the best method for creating a policy index is to weight 
each of the three indicators by the variable's impact on economic growth. They therefore utilize 
ordinary least squares (OLS) to estimate a regression of growth on all the variables included in 
their growth equation, excluding the foreign aid variables. As previously mentioned, these 
variables include the three individual macroeconomic variables as well as a vector of control 
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variables such as ethnic fractionalization, education, institutional quality, regional dummies, etc. 
The index is then formed by weighting each of the policy variables by the corresponding 
regression coefficient and scaling the weighted average to have the same mean as per capita 
GPD growth. This study utilizes a similar method for determining the policy index by estimating 
the following equation using OLS: 
(3) HDlit = ~1 + ~2GDPO/capitait + ~3PPE/GDP it + ~4Budget/GDPit + ~5Inflationit + 
~60penness/GDPit + Sit 
where Budget/GDP is the government budget surplus (deficit) relative to GDP, Inflation is the 
natural logarithm of the inflation rate plus one, and Openness/GDP is exports plus imports 
relative to GDP. Hence, from equation (3), the following policy index is created: 
(4) PolicYit = a + ~4Budget/GDPit + ~5Inflationit + ~6Openness/GDPit 
where a is a scalar term that ensures that the weighted average has the same mean as HDI. As the 
quality of macroeconomic policies increase, HDI should similarly increase, so the policy variable 
is predicted to be positively correlated with HDI. 
Several studies (such as BD (2000); Collier and Dollar (2001,2002)) find that foreign aid 
only produces economic growth in countries with "good" macroeconomic policies. This 
conclusion is determined by including an interaction term between aid and the policy index in 
the growth equation. Since this study seeks to determine if a similar result holds regarding 
foreign aid's impact on aggregate welfare and development, an interaction term between foreign 
aid and the policy index is also considered. It is hypothesized that the Aid*Policy interaction 
term will have a positive impact on HDI, reflecting the increased effectiveness of aid in countries 
with pro-growth economic policies. 
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D. Controlling for the Endogeneity o(Aid 
As indicated by the previously-cited studies, the direction of causation between foreign 
aid and development is uncertain. Development assistance is typically extended to low-income 
countries in order to promote economic growth and to advance the level of development. To the 
degree that foreign aid is successful in raising aggregate welfare in a developing country, foreign 
aid should be positively correlated with a country's HDI or other measures of aggregate welfare. 
Since donor countries, however, tend to provide more development assistance to countries with 
lower economic growth rates, there could also be a negative correlation between GDP and 
foreign aid (Easterly, 2003). To the extent that GDP is correlated with HDI, foreign aid could 
have a negative relationship with HDI as well. 
In order to control for this problem, Gomanee, Morrissey, Mosley, and Verschoor (2005) 
lag the aid term one period so that aid from the previous period is employed to predict current 
HDI. To the extent that welfare changes slowly over time, however, this technique may not 
completely solve the problem of endogeneity. Other researchers, such as BD, employ two-stage 
least squares (2SLS) estimation techniques in order to endogenize aid. This econometric method 
consists of first estimating one equation in which foreign aid is regressed against GDP per capita 
and one or more instrumental variables and then estimating a second equation in which a 
measure of development is regressed against the predicted aid values from the first equation and 
additional exogenous variables. Since 2SLS is a better technique for endogenizing aid, this study 
applies this econometric method, estimating aid in the first-stage equation and utilizing these 
very values to estimate HDI in the second-stage equation. Hence, aid is treated as endogenous to 
the model while all other variables are assumed to be exogenous. 
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With regard to the first-stage equation estimating aid, several studies explore the 
variables which determine the allocation ofdevelopment assistance to developing countries 
(Maizels and Nissanke (1984); Alesina and Dollar (2000); Alesina and Weder (2002)). Since 
donors tend to contribute more foreign aid to countries with lower levels of GDP, a result 
confirmed by BD, GDPO/capitait is included in the aid equation. GDPO/capitait is thus predicted 
to have a negative relationship with aid. Aid donors may also provide more development aid to 
recipient countries which possess "good" macroeconomic policies. A donating country or 
organization may believe, for example, that its aid contributions will be more effective in 
countries with pro-growth policies. Aid donors may similarly want to reward countries for 
enacting macroeconomic reforms and have their increased aid serve as an incentive for other 
countries to adopt reforms as well. In consideration ofany correlation between aid and 
macroeconomic policy, BD include their policy index as an independent variable in their first­
stage aid equation. Although BD find that policy has an insignificant impact on aid allocation, 
Alesina and Dollar (2000) conclude that a significant positive relationship exists between 
democracy and aid allocation and trade openness and aid allocation. This study accounts for this 
connection by also including the policy index as an explanatory variable for aid. Policy is 
hypothesized to have a positive impact on aid. 
Research on aid allocation also considers the impact of a country's strategic importance 
on the amount of development aid received by that nation. Economists have explored the 
correlation between such variables as colonizing country, national religion, proportion of UN 
votes shared with the donating nation, and arms transfers to the allocation of aid to developing 
countries (Alesina and Dollar (2000); Alesina and Werler (2002)). Many of these studies, 
however, are inconclusive, and to consider all of these strategic variables in the aid allocation 
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equation lies outside the scope of this study. Two strategic variables, however, are included in 
the estimation of aid allocation. Since many studies conclude that smaller countries receive more 
aid per capita than larger countries (Maizels and Nissanke (1984); Alesina and Dollar (2000); 
BD (2000)), a population variable is included in the first-stage equation. This variable is 
predicted to be negatively correlated with the level of foreign aid. Alesina and Dollar (2000) and 
BD also find that Egypt, because of its historical and political importance in the Middle East, 
receives significantly more aid than other countries with similar levels ofper capita income, 
particularly from the United States. Thus, like Alesina and Dollar (2000) and BD, this study 
includes a dichotomous variable which equals one for the country of Egypt and zero otherwise in 
order to capture the increased level of aid received by Egypt. This variable is hypothesized to be 
positive. 
As previously stated, this study utilizes 2SLS estimation to determine the impact of 
foreign aid on HDI while controlling for the endogeneity of aid and other exogenous variables. 
Thus, the following two equations are estimated: 
(5) Aid/GDPit = &1 + &2GDPO/capitait + &3Populationit+ &4Egyptit +&sPolicYit + Bit 
(6) HDIit = Yl + Y2GDPO/capitait + Y3PPE/GDPit +Y4Aid/GDPit + YsPolicYit + 
Y6(Aid/GDPit)*PolicYit + Bit 
where i indexes countries, t indexes the time period, HDI is the Human Development Index, 
GDPO/capita is initial real GDP per capita, PPE/GDP is pro-poor expenditure relative to GDP, 
Aid/GDP is the level of foreign aid relative to GDP, Policy is an index ofmacroeconomic 
policies which impact the level ofdevelopment in a country, Population is a country's 
population, and Egypt is a dichotomous variable capturing the high level of aid given to Egypt. 
In estimating equations (5) and (6), all variables are entered as natural logarithms except for the 
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Egypt and the Policy variables. This follows the methodology ofGomanee, Ginna, and 
Morrissey (2003) and Gomanee, Morrissey, Mosley, and Verschoor (2005), which allows the 
coefficients to be interpreted as elasticities, meaning that the coefficients represent the 
percentage change in the dependent variable when the independent variable increases by one 
percent. 
IV. Data 
The data used in this study are obtained from a variety of sources. As is often the case 
with statistical research on developing countries, data on many variables are frequently 
unavailable or inaccessible for all countries in all years. To overcome this difficulty, some of the 
data included in this study are derived from previous studies (notably, Gomanee, Morrissey, 
Mosley, and Verschoor (2005» rather than original sources. Furthennore, this study follows 
Gomanee, Morrissey, Mosley, and Verschoor (2005) by averaging the data over several years in 
order to compensate for missing observations, to create a more complete data set, and to 
overcome the fact that HDI is only available for every five years. Like Gomanee, Morrissey, 
Mosley, and Verschoor (2005), this study averages all of the available data over five mutually 
exclusive periods: 1980-1983 (Period 1), 1984-1987 (Period 2), 1988-1991 (Period 3), 1992­
1995 (Period 4), and 1996-2000 (Period 5). 
HDI values are published annually in the United Nations Development Program's 
(UNDP) Human Development Report. While these measures cannot be compared from year to 
year because of differences in methodology and revisions, every edition of the Human 
Development Report includes comparable trend data at five-year intervals for HDI starting in 
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1975. HDI data for 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, and 2000 are included in this study. 2 HDI values 
range from zero to one, with one representing the highest level of development. As mentioned 
previously, Appendix I provides details on the exact calculation ofthe HDI. 
The UNDP divides countries into three categories: high development (HDI values of 0.8 
and above), medium development (HDI values between 0.5 and 0.8), and low development (HDI 
values below 0.5). Since this study examines the impact of foreign aid on developing countries, 
the 113 countries ranked in 2006 as having medium or low development are examined in this 
study. Twenty-six countries which have no HDI observations for any of the time periods 
between 1975 and 2000 were dropped, leaving 87 countries having at least one HDI observation 
to be included in the study. To the extent that the countries excluded from the study possess 
similar characteristics, dropping this group could bias the results. However, the countries 
included (see Appendix II) represent a wide range of developing countries which should supply a 
balanced foundation for analysis. 
Data for the foreign aid variable are acquired from the World Bank's World Development 
Indicators, which lists yearly net official development assistance and official aid, in current U.S. 
dollars, for a large group ofdeveloping countries. Net official development assistance and 
official aid consists of "loans made on concessional terms (net of repayments ofprincipal) and 
grants ... to promote economic development and welfare" (World Bank, 2007). In order to 
compare development aid across time, these data for development assistance are subsequently 
converted into real values using the United States Consumer Price Index. The resulting data are 
2 Since HDI observations occur at five year intervals, this study would ideally average the data over five-year time 
periods, each containing one HDI observation. However, due to data availability, this study must use the time 
periods utilized in Gomanee, Morrissey, Mosley, and Verschoor (2005). Nevertheless, each time period in this study 
does include one HDI observation. 
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divided by the real GDP for the respective country to produce a value of foreign aid as a 
percentage ofa country's GDP. 
Values for initial real GDP per capita, GDPO/capita, are also obtained from the World 
Development Indicators. Replicating the methodology of Gomanee, Morrissey, Mosley, and 
Verschoor (2005), GDPO/capitait represents GDP per capita in country i in constant 1995 US 
dollars in the year preceding the start of time period t.3 
As previously discussed UPPE/GDP and BPPE/GDP are calculated as follows: 
(1) UPPE/GDP = PJJGDP + PJGDP + PJGDP 
(2) BPPE/GDP= ~hPJJGDP + ~ePJGDP + ~sPJGDP. 
Unfortunately, data for some components of the PPE indices were unobtainable for this current 
study (specifically, all ofPJGDP and portions ofPJGDP). However, the authors ofGomanee, 
Morrissey, Mosley, and Verschoor (2005) kindly provided data for both the UPPE/GDP and 
BPPE/GDP indices. These authors obtained public expenditure on health (PJJGDP) from 
UNESCO's annual statistical yearbooks, while public expenditure on education (PJGDP) was 
found in the IMF's Government Finance Statistics database. Spending on housing, sanitation, 
and water (PJGDP) was taken from the World Development Indicators. Prior to 1993, the World 
Bank reported expenditures on social services, so PJGDP is obtained by subtracting PJGDP and 
Ph/GDP from total expenditures on social services. In 1993, the World Bank redefined its public 
expenditure variables and created a variable measuring spending on housing, sanitation, and 
water. Thus, after 1993, PJGDP is taken directly from the World Development Indicators. Since 
the authors ofGomanee, Morrissey, Mosley, and Verschoor (2005) provided data for the PPE 
3 Utilizing GDP in the year preceding the start of time period t may capture an economic expansion or recession. 
While averaging GDP over several years prior to the start of time period t would smooth out any such fluctuations 
from long-term real income, GDP in the year immediately prior to the start of time period t is used in order to 
replicate the Gomannee, Morrissey, Mosley, and Verschoor (2005) study. 
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indices rather than data for the individual expenditure categories, their beta-weights must be 
utilized. BPPE/GDP is, hence, calculated as follows: 
(7) BPPE/GDP = 0.1032*Ph/GDP + 0.1150*PJGDP + 0.2309*Ps/GDP. 
These beta-weights represent the relative importance that each expenditure category has on 
increasing HDI. The coefficients indicate that expenditure on sanitation, housing, and water, 
have the greatest impact on welfare, while expenditure on healthcare has the least. 
As mentioned previously, including both Aid/GDP and PPE/GDP in the same equation 
may lead to double counting of foreign aid if the level of pro-poor spending depends on the 
amount of aid a country receives. To address this possible double counting, the PPE indices are 
stripped of foreign aid by regressing each of the PPE indices against foreign aid and then saving 
the residual values of each regression. Appendix III presents the results of these regressions. 
Although the magnitudes of the coefficients on Aid/GDP are small, the negative signs on these 
coefficients indicate that aid and pro-poor expenditure have an inverse relationship. This 
relationship is marginally significant for the beta-weighted PPE index and insignificant for the 
unweighted PPE index. The negative correlation suggests that governments in developing 
countries may reduce pro-poor expenditure in response to increased aid. In other words, foreign 
aid may "crowd out" PPE ifgovernments reduce spending on pro-poor sectors in response to 
increased development assistance. These regressions, however, have very low adjusted R2 values 
(0.004 when UPPE/GDP is regressed against Aid/GDP and 0.008 when BPPE/GDP is regressed 
against Aid/GDP). Such small R2 values imply that the variation in Aid/GDP does not explain 
much of the variation in PPE, which suggests that very little double counting of aid is occurring. 
The policy index is comprised of three variables: total trade volume (exports plus 
imports) as a percentage ofGDP, budget surplus (deficit) as a percentage ofGDP, and the 
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natural logarithm of one plus the inflation rate. All three variables are found in the Global 
Development Network Growth Database, a World Bank: database created by William Easterly. 
Easterly compiles data from both the World Development Indicators and the Government 
Finance Statistics in order to provide more accurate and complete data for a large set of 
countries. In this database, the inflation rate is defined as the percentage change in consumer 
prices. In addition, the overall budget surplus (deficit) includes grants received by developing 
countries. 
Finally, population data are taken from the World Development Indicators. Table I 
provides descriptive statistics for each of the variables included in the model. 
v. Results 
A. Influence ofMacroeconomic Policy 
The first step in the empirical model is to estimate equation (3), the HDI regression 
excluding all aid terms, in order to construct the policy index. The results for this regression are 
presented in Table 2. Column I displays the results using UPPE/GDP as the pro-poor 
expenditure index while Column 2 displays the results using BPPE/GDP as the expenditure 
index. In both regressions, initial GDP per capita and pro-poor expenditure have a significant and 
positive effect on a country's HDI. As predicted, higher initial GDP and greater levels of pro-
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Definition N Minimum Maximum Mean Std Dev 
HDI Human Development Index 349 0.260 0.809 0.555 0.147 
AidJGDP (Constant Dollar Aid)/(Rea1 GDP) 349 0.017 65.618 8.502 9.667 
GDPO/capita Real GDP per capita 349 92.409 4415.371 1014.729 922.265 
UPPE/GDP Unweighted PPE index (Equation 1) 349 0.019 38.519 6.202 4.292 
BPPE/GDP Beta-weight PPE index (Equation 7) 349 0.002 4.742 0.859 0.675 
Population Population (millions) 349 0.152 1238.500 5.162 166.513 
Budget/GDP (Constant Dollar Budget Surp1us)/(Real GDP) 162 -18.204 4.325 -4.429 3.919 
Inflation LN(l + inflation rate) 162 -0.003 4.167 0.280 0.608 
Openness/GDP (Constant Dollar Exports+Imports)/(Real GDP) 162 13.885 153.493 59.071 32.043 
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poor government expenditure are associated with higher aggregate welfare and development in 
developing countries. 
Although all of the macroeconomic policy variables have the intuitive signs, none are 
significant in either of the HDI regressions. The results in Table 2 thus indicate that 
macroeconomic policy variables such as openness, budget surplus, and inflation have no 
additional explanatory power after controlling for initial GDP and pro-poor expenditure. This 
finding appears to imply that macroeconomic policies do not have a direct impact on HDI. 
Instead, their impact occurs indirectly by increasing growth rates, which in tum raises HDI. The 
inclusion of the PPE indices in the HDI regression may also reflect government policy since 
higher PPE values correspond to greater public spending on sectors benefiting the poor. Any of 
the effects of "good" policy may as a consequence be captured by the PPE variables instead of 
the macroeconomic policy variables. 
Table 2: HDI Regressions Excluding Aid Terms 
(1) (2) (3) 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
Constant -0.278*** -5.599 -0.278*** -5.600 0.532*** 20.690 
(0.050) (0.050) (0.026) 
GDPO/capita 0.121*** 16.523 0.121*** 16.599 
(0.007) (0.007) 
UPPE/GDP 0.005** 3.058 
(0.002) 
BPPE/GDP 0.029** 2.992 
(0.010) 
Openness/GDP 0.000 1.056 0.000 1.454 0.001*** 2.519 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Budget/GDP 0.002 1.030 0.002 0.936 0.007* 2.542 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Inflation -0.005 -0.394 -0.006 -0.503 0.077*** 3.742 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.020) 
Adjusted R2 0.715 0.714 0.110 
f-statistic 81.700 81.247 7.859 
N 162 162 167 
Note: '"Significant at the 5-percent level, '"'"Significant at the I-percent level, and '"'"'"Significant at the 
OJ-percent level. Numbers in parenthesis represent standard errors for each coefficient. HOI, 
GDPO/capita, UPPFJGDP, BPPFJGDP, and Inflation are measured as natural logarithms. 
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Column 3 ofTable 2, which presents results for equation (3) without the initial GDP tenn 
and the PPE indices, confinns this explanation. In this regression, all three policy variables are 
individually significant. The regression in Column 3, however, does not explain as much of the 
variance in HDI as the regressions which include GDPO/capita and PPE. This is illustrated by the 
lower adjusted R-square of0.110 (compared to 0.715 in Column I and 0.714 in Column 2). The 
coefficient for the inflation variable is also the opposite sign as predicted, which indicates the 
puzzling conclusion that higher inflation is correlated with increased HDI values. 
The insignificance of the macroeconomic policy variables in the HDI equation indicates 
that the coefficients on each of the macroeconomic policy variables cannot be utilized as weights 
for creating the policy index. Since macroeconomic policy does not influence HDI directly, there 
is little theoretical justification to believe that macroeconomic variables impact how well 
development aid effects HDI. Ultimately, the irrelevance ofmacroeconomic policy variables in 
detennining HDI requires that the policy variables be excluded from subsequent regressions in 
this study. 
With the policy indices excluded from equations (5) and (6), the new regressions to be 
. d 4estImate are: 
B. Influence o(Aid 
Table 3 presents the results of the 2SLS estimation of equations (8) and (9). Column I 
indicates the first-stage regression where initial GDP, population, and the Egypt variable are 
4 Although the macroeconomic policy variables are insignificant in explaining HDI variations, macroeconomic 
policies could theoretically influence the allocation of aid to developing countries. When the individual 
macroeconomic policy variables were included in the aid regression, however, none were significant to the five­
percent level (see Appendix IV). The macroeconomic policies were, therefore, also excluded from the aid allocation 
regression. 
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utilized to predict aid allocation. Columns 2 through 5 illustrate the results from the second-stage 
regression in which HDI is regressed against the predicted aid values, initial GDP, and the 
various PPE indices. In the first stage regression, all variables are statistically significant to at 
least the O.l-percent level and all posses the hypothesized sign. These results confirm the 
conclusions ofBD and Alesina and Dollar (2000), that nations with smaller populations receive 
more foreign aid relative to GDP, while Egypt is given significantly more aid than other 
countries, ceteris paribus. Moreover, GDPO/capita's negative impact on aid allocation parallels 
the finding that donors extend foreign aid to countries with lower levels ofGDP. For every one 
percent increase in a country's initial real GDP, that country receives 1.225 percent less foreign 
aid relative to real GDP. 
Table 3: Aid and HDI Regressions (2SLS) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
Constant 19.144*** 34.198 -1.949*** -18.991 -1.868*** -17.364 -1.880*** -17.753 -1.905*** -17.931 
(0.560) (0.103) (0.108) (0.106) (0.106) 
Population -0.610*** -22.443 
(0.027) 
Egypt 1.622*** 4.4143 
(0.389) 
Aid/GDP -0.034*** -3.626 -0.032*** -3.409 -0.039*** -4.088 -0.037*** -3.896 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
GDPO/capita -1.225*** -25.028 0.196*** 13.286 0.200*** 13.431 0.200*** 13.502 0.203*** 13.685 
(0.049) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
UPPE/GDP 0.055*** 4.217 
(0.013) 
BPPE/GDP 0.042*** 3.353 
(0.012) 
UPPEre/GDP 0.007** 2.961 
(0.002) 
BPPEre/GDP 0.029* 2.041 
(0.014) 
Adjusted R2 0.735 0.654 0.648 0.652 0.648 
f-statistic 351.698 224.688 218.638 218.443 214.105 
N 380 356 356 349 349 
Note: *Significant at the 5-percent level, **Significant at the I-percent level, and ***Significant at the a.l-percent level. Numbers in parenthesis represent 
standard errors for each coefficient. All variables except Egypt are measured as natural logs. Standard errors and t-statistics in the second-stage regression do 
not take into account results from the first-stage regression. 
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All variables in the second stage regressions are also statistically significant. As 
previously found by Gomanee, Morrissey, Mosley, and Verschoor (2005), initial real GDP per 
capita and pro-poor expenditure both have a positive impact on HDI. This finding is robust 
regardless ofwhether UPPE/GDP or BPPE/GDP is included in the regression, or whether the 
residual values for PPE are included in the regression. The fact that these results are robust, even 
when including the residual PPE values, can be explained by the low magnitude of the 
coefficients on Aid/GDP in the regressions in Appendix III, as well as the low R2 values for these 
regressions. Hence, there appears to be very little double counting of foreign aid when both 
Aid/GDP and PPE/GDP are included in the HDI regressions, and stripping foreign aid from the 
PPE values does not affect the positive signs on either GDPO/capita or PPE/GDP. A one percent 
increase in initial real GDP per capita corresponds to approximately a 0.20 percent increase in 
HDI no matter the PPE index, illustrating that countries with higher initial GDP possess higher 
HDI levels. Furthermore, a one percent increase in the unweighted PPE index corresponds to a 
0.055 percent increase in HDI. A one percent increase in the beta-weighted PPE index 
corresponds to a 0.042 percent increase in HDI. The coefficients for the PPE index are smaller 
once aid is stripped out from the indices, yet they still indicate that HDI increases by 0.007 
percent when the residual UPPE/GDP index increases by one percent and that HDI increases by 
0.029 percent when the residual beta-weighted PPE index increases by one percent. These 
positive coefficients on the PPE indices demonstrate that government spending on social services 
such as healthcare, education, housing, sanitation, and water is effective in improving welfare. 
While the aid variable is statistically significant, the variable's negative coefficient in 
Columns 2-5 is the opposite sign from the one that is predicted and that was empirically 
determined in studies by Mosley, Hudson, and Verschoor (2004), Gomanee, Girma, and 
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Morrissey (2004), and Gomanee, Morrissey, Mosley, and Verschoor (2005). Since the 
endogeneity of aid is controlled for by 2SLS, this negative coefficient on aid does not reflect the 
fact that donors provide more assistance to poorer countries. Rather, these results appear to 
indicate that increased foreign aid, when controlling for initial GDP and pro-poor expenditure, 
leads to lower levels of aggregate welfare and human development. For the average country 
included in this study, the coefficient for the aid variable indicates that a ten percent increase in 
aid from 9.3336 to 10.2670 percent ofGDP causes HDI to decline from 0.5545 to at least 0.5524 
(Column 4) and to at most 0.5528 (Column 3). Increasing foreign aid, thus, appears to reduce 
HDI and aggregate welfare in developing countries. This conclusion contradicts the hypothesis 
that development aid improves HDI, and this result seems to suggest that foreign aid to 
developing countries should be reduced. However, if foreign aid is being misallocated and 
misused to finance non-development related tasks (such as arms expenditure or payoffs for 
corrupt officials), then increased aid could theoretically have no impact on HDI. Many studies on 
foreign aid, in fact, include additional control variables such as corruption or military 
expenditure in order to capture the fact that some foreign aid may be misallocated toward 
projects that do not affect HDI. Hence, excluding these variables from the model in this study 
may bias the aid results. It could also be the case that additional variables beyond aid, such as 
PPE, are endogenous to the model, and treating these variables as exogenous could produce the 
negative coefficient on aid. Furthermore, in order to consider the impact of aid on developing 
nations, this study excludes the high-human development countries included in Gomanee, 
Morrissey, Mosley, and Verschoor (2005). It could thus also be that the different sample of 
countries is driving the negative coefficient on aid found in this study. 
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C. Influence ofAid in Low or Medium Human Development Countries 
Including all developing nations ranked as having low and medium human development 
together in one regression may also impact the results. Aid may be allocated to low and medium 
human development countries differently, since donors may specifically target aid to countries 
with low levels ofhealth or education. In addition, development assistance could have dissimilar 
effects on aggregate welfare in low and medium human development countries. For instance, 
medium human development countries may have better infrastructure and greater absorptive 
capacity, so aid may be more effective in nations with medium human development. In order to 
investigate this more closely, this study divides the sample ofcountries into a low human 
development subsample (HOI ofless than 0.5) and a medium human development subsample 
(HOI greater than or equal to 0.5 and less than 0.8). 5 As Tables 4 and 5 indicate, low human 
development countries, on average, receive more aid relative to GOP than medium human 
development countries. In addition, governments in countries ranked as medium human 
development spend a slightly larger percentage of GOP on pro-poor expenditure than 
governments in countries ranked as low human development. Appendix II also illustrates that the 
majority oflow human development countries tend to be located in sub-Saharan Africa. To the 
extent that the effectiveness of aid differs between sub-Saharan Africa and other regions of the 
world, aid effectiveness may vary between low human development and medium human 
development nations. For all ofthese reasons, equations (8) and (9) are re-estimated for both 
subsamples to see if aid effectiveness diverges between low and medium human development 
countries. 
5 Countries are assigned to a subsample based on their 2000 HDI value, which corresponds to time period five. Since 
a country's HDI may increase or decrease over time, using the value in period five prevents nations from being 
included in one subsample in one period and the other subsample in a different period. 
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Tables 6 and 7 provide the regression results for the low and medium human 
development subsamples, respectively. Column I in Tables 6 and 7 indicate that all variables in 
the first-stage regressions are significant to the O.I-percent level and all possess the hypothesized 
sign in both subsamples. As was found for the full sample of countries, nations with smaller 
populations receive more foreign aid relative to GDP. In both the low human development 
subsample and the medium human development subsample, initial GOP has a negative impact on 
the amount of aid received. Thus, donors extend less aid to countries with higher levels of GDP. 
Compared to countries with medium human development, Egypt receives significantly more 
development assistance, ceteris paribus.6 Since similar results were obtained in the first-stage 
regressions for both low and medium human development countries, it appears that donors do 
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for Low Human Development Countries 
Variable Definition N Minimum Maximum Mean Std Dev 
HDI Human Development Index 121 0.260 0.626 0.398 0.077 
Aid/GDP (Constant Dollar Aid)/(Real GDP) 121 0.086 65.618 14.580 11.881 
GDPO/capita Real GDP per capita 121 92.409 1219.633 352.922 205.660 
UPPE/GDP Unweighted PPE index (Equation 1) 121 0.019 22.243 6.2017 4.2916 
BPPE/GDP Beta-weight PPE index (Equation 7) 121 0.002 3.532 0.859 0.675 
Population Population (millions) 121 0.887 131.610 18.846 27.332 
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics for Medium Human Development Countries 
Variable Definition N Minimum Maximum Mean StdDev
 
HOI Human Development Index 235 0.352 0.809 0.641 0.098
 
Aid/GDP (Constant Dollar Aid)/(Real GDP) 235 0.017 37.830 5.276 6.204
 
GDPO/capita Real GDP per capita 235 160.202 4415.371 1381.736 987.858
 
UPPE/GDP Unweighted PPE index (Equation 1) 235 0.320 38.519 7.289 4.636
 
BPPE/GDP Beta-weight PPE index (Equation 7) 235 0.074 4.742 1.007 0.724
 
Population Population (millions) 235 0.152 1238.5 67.305 200.253
 
6 Since Egypt is a medium human development country, the Egypt dichotomous variable was excluded from the 
first-stage regression for the low human development subsample. Because the Egypt variable was omitted from the 
first stage regression for the low human development subsample, coefficients from the first-stage regressions cannot 
be compared across the two subsamples. 
32 
not allocate aid to nations with low and medium human development in systematically different 
ways. 
Columns 2 through 5 in both tables 6 and 7 also illustrate that initial GDP per capita 
maintains a significant positive impact on HDI when dividing the countries into the low and 
medium human development subsamples. For countries with low human development, a one 
percent increase in initial GDP raises HDI by 0.142 percent to 0.150 percent, depending on the 
PPE index included in the regression. The coefficients for initial GDP are slightly smaller for 
countries with medium human development, and a one percent increase in initial GDP increases 
HDI by at least 0.122 percent to at most 0.128 percent. This slight difference in the coefficients 
for initial GDP between the two subsamples indicates that, ceteris paribus, initial GDP has a 
greater impact on HDI in low human development countries than in medium human 
Table 6: Aid and HDI Regressions for Low Human Development Countries (2SLS) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
Constant 16.564*** 14.479 -1.638*** -8.361 -1.584*** -8.166 -1.527*** -8.056 -1.544*** -8.023 
(1.144) (0.196) (0.194) (0.190) (0.192) 
Population -0.610*** -11.483 
(0.053) 
AidJGDP -0.086*** -3.833 -0.087*** -3.837 -0.089*** -4.173 -0.090*** -4.131 
(0.022) (0.023) (0.021) (0.022) 
GDPO/capita -0.776*** -6.872 0.150*** 5.237 0.150*** 5.186 0.142*** 5.031 0.144*** 5.034 
(0.113) (0.029) (0.023) (0.028) (0.029) 
UPPE/GDP 0.0250 1.421 
(0.018) 
BPPE/GDP 0.018 1.005 
(0.017) 
UPPEreJGDP 0.013** 2.862 
(0.005) 
BPPEreJGDP 0.066* 2.104 
(0.032) 
Adjusted~ 0.539 0.405 0.400 0.434 0.417 
f-statistic 79.381 28.224 27.653 31.709 29.584 
N 139 121 121 121 121 
Note: *Significant at the 5-percent level, **Significant at the I-percent level, and ***Significant at the O.I-percent level. Numbers in parenthesis 
represent standard errors for each coefficient. All variables are measured as natural logarithms. Standard errors and t-statistics in the second-stage regression do not 
take into accoWlt results from the first-stage regression. 
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development countries. Nevertheless, it still holds that countries with greater initial GDP have 
higher levels of aggregate welfare and human development, even when dividing the countries by 
level of development. 
Dividing the countries into the two subsamples does impact the significance and the signs 
of the pro-poor expenditure variables. While all the PPE indices are positive and significant in 
the full sample regressions, PPE is only positive and significant in low human development 
countries when utilizing UPPEreslGDP and BPPEreslGDP (Columns 4 and 5 ofTable 6, 
respectively). In all the other regressions in Table 6 and 7, PPE is insignificant, and in some 
cases, the sign becomes negative. This result indicates that the positive effect of pro-poor 
Table 7: Aid and HDI Regressions for Medium Human Development Countries (2SLS) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
Constant 19.917*** 24.969 -1.333*** -13.739 -1.584*** -13.222 -1.340*** -13.579 -1.343*** -13.624 
(0.798) (0.097) (0.194) (0.099) (0.099) 
Population -0.609*** -18.777 
(0.032) 
Egypt 1.592*** 3.761 
(0.423) 
Aid/GDP -0.012 -1.625 -0.011 -1.424 -0.013 -1.652 -0.012 -1.660 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) 
GDPO/capita -1.339*** -17.178 0.122*** 8.881 0.126*** 9.172 0.128*** 9.369 0.128*** 9.412 
(0.078) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
UPPE/GDP 0.018 1.394 
(0.013) 
BPPE/GDP 0.003 0.258 
(0.017) 
UPPEreJGDP -0.001 -0.382 
(0.002) 
PPEreJGDP -0.007 -0.639 
(0.011) 
AdjustedR2 0.707 0.440 0.435 0.444 0.444 
f-statistic 194.241 62.177 61.055 61.350 61.510 
N 241 235 235 235 235 
Note: *Significant at the 5-percent level, **Significant at the I-percent level, and ***Significant at the OJ-percent level. Numbers in parenthesis represent 
standard errors for each coefficient. All variables except Egypt are measured as natural logarithms. Standard errors and t-statistics in the second-stage regression 
do not take into account results from the first-stage regression. 
34 
expenditure on aggregate welfare is not robust when considering only low human development 
or only medium human development countries. 
For nations with low human development, the foreign aid variable continues to be 
significant and negative, regardless of which PPE index is included in the regression. In fact, the 
coefficients are more negative than the coefficients for the full sample, ranging from -0.086 
(Table 6, Column 2) to -0.090 (Table 6, Column 5). The greater negative magnitude on the aid 
variable implies that foreign aid causes HDI to decrease by a greater amount in countries with 
low levels ofhuman development than in all developing countries. For nations with medium 
human development, the aid variable continues to have a negative coefficient regardless of the 
PPE index utilized. However, these coefficients are insignificantly different from zero. Foreign 
aid, therefore, appears to have no significant impact on HDI in medium human development 
countries. 
VI. Conclusion 
This paper examined the impact of foreign aid on aggregate welfare, as measured by the 
Human Development Index (HDI), in developing countries. Following empirical models 
developed in previous research examining the effect of aid on HDI, the model utilized in this 
study included control variables for initial GDP and pro-poor government expenditure. This 
study also sought to determine ifmacroeconomic policies influence the impact of foreign aid on 
aggregate welfare by including a policy index as well as an interaction term between aid and 
policy in the empirical model. Since the direction of causation between foreign aid and HDI is 
unclear, two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation was utilized to control for the endogeneity of 
aid. Hence, foreign aid values were estimated in the first-stage equation, and then these predicted 
values for aid were utilized to estimate HDI in the second-stage equation. 
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This study finds that for the entire sample of developing countries, higher levels of 
foreign aid decrease HDI. This contradicts the empirical results of Mosley, Hudson, and 
Verschoor (2004), Gomanee, Girma, and Morrissey (2004), and Gomanee, Morrissey, Mosley, 
and Verschoor (2005). The negative relationship holds when looking only at countries with low 
human development, while aid has an insignificant impact on HDI in countries with medium 
human development. The study also finds that macroeconomic policies such as inflation, trade 
openness, and budget surpluses do not impact a country's level ofhuman development when 
controlling for real per capita income and pro-poor government expenditures. This study, 
therefore, is unable to test whether BD's finding that aid is more effective at increasing growth in 
countries with pro-growth economic policies is also true for aid's effectiveness at increasing 
aggregate welfare. 
The negative relationship between foreign aid and HDI for the entire sample and for 
nations with low human development presents an unexpected result, especially considering the 
positive relationship found by Gomanee, Morrissey, Mosley, and Verschoor (2005). If greater 
aid does cause HDI to decrease, it would suggest that donors should stop providing assistance to 
developing countries since this aid will hinder, rather than promote, development. Before this 
conclusion is adopted, however, future research must be conducted to further investigate this 
inverse relationship between aid and HDI. As previously mentioned, one possible explanation 
could be omitted variable bias, in that a theoretically significant variable is missing from the 
model. For instance, Dalgaard, Hansen, and Tarp (2004) demonstrate that controlling for the 
percentage of a developing nation located within the tropics causes the aid variable to become 
insignificant in influencing GDP growth. It might be the case that controlling for the percentage 
of a nation located within the tropics similarly impacts the significance of the aid variable in 
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predicting HDI. Other socio-economic variables, such as corruption, inequality, armed conflict, 
or military expenditure could also negatively influence the HDI level of a developing country. 
Unfortunately, all of these variables were not included in this study due to limited data 
availability. Future studies would hopefully consider some of these variables when testing for the 
effectiveness of aid on aggregate welfare. 
Limited data availability in general may also have impacted the relationship between aid 
and HDI. Due to missing data, this study could only consider data that was averaged across five 
periods from 1980-2000. Future studies analyzing aid effectiveness would definitely benefit from 
more full and complete data. The adoption of the Millennium Development Goals in 2000, the 
convening of the Monterrey Conference, and the creation of the Millennium Challenge Account 
in 2002, along with recent calls for increased foreign aid have undoubtedly affected the 
environment in which aid is now donated to developing countries. Extending the data past 2000 
to reflect this new donor attitude might affect the results of this study. In addition, this study 
considers a general measure of foreign aid by looking at official development assistance. Since 
different types of aid, such as bilateral assistance or aid from nongovernmental organizations that 
is tied to a particular project, may have differing impacts on aggregate welfare, future research 
should address how the type of aid impacts its effectiveness. 
Treating other variables beyond aid as endogenous may also impact the relationship 
between development assistance and aggregate welfare. In particular, the pro-poor expenditure 
index may be endogenous to the model. Donors may extend greater amounts of aid to countries 
which spend larger portions of their budgets on pro-poor sectors of the economy. In addition, 
foreign aid may "crowd out" pro-poor expenditure if governments receiving development aid 
reduce their spending in response. The small but negative relationship between foreign aid and 
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PPE illustrated in Appendix III suggests that some "crowding out" may, in fact, be occurring. 
Future research, therefore, should control for the endogeneity of pro-poor expenditure in order to 
take into account these two possibilities. 
Despite the negative relationship between foreign aid and aggregate welfare, this study 
does suggest that increased pro-poor expenditure in developing countries does improve 
aggregate welfare. However, increasing aggregate welfare and decreasing extreme poverty in 
persistently impoverished countries are goals which cannot be accomplished through one line of 
action. While previous research indicates that foreign aid can play some role in increasing 
growth and aggregate welfare, these past studies are not robust to all specifications. By 
controlling for the endogeneity of foreign aid through two-stage least squares estimation, this 
study further questions the robustness of the results ofpast research. In the end, the lack of 
conclusive results regarding aid's overall effectiveness on welfare illustrates the difficulty in 
making a general conclusion across such a wide-array ofunique and dissimilar countries. 
Foreign assistance, under some circumstances, will likely improve the livelihood of individuals 
living in extreme poverty. However, numerous issues, including many non-quantifiable ones 
such as natural disasters or political climate, factor into whether or not development aid is 
effective in recipient countries. Therefore, because of the underlying diversity both between and 
within developing countries, foreign aid is not a one-size-fits-all solution to the problem of 
extreme poverty in the developing world. 
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Appendix I: Calculation of the Human Development Index 
The Human Development Index is the average of three indices: 
-A Life Expectancy Index: (Life Expectancy - 25) / (85 - 25) 
-An Education Index: (2/3)*Literacy Index + (l/3)*School Enrollment Index 
-Literacy Index: Adult Literacy Rate /100 
-School Enrollment Index: Gross Enrollment Rate / 100 
-GDP Index: (In(GDP) -In(1 00)) / (In(40000) -In(l 00)) 
Therefore, HDI = (l/3)*Life Expectancy Index + (l/3)*Education Index + (l/3)*GDP Index 
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Appendix II: Countries Included in this Study 
Countries are classified according to their HDI value in 2000 
Low Human Development Countries (HDI < 0.5) 
Latin America and Caribbean 
Haiti 
Middle East and North Africa 
Yemen 
South Asia 
Nepal 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Benin 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cameroon 
Central African Republic 
Chad 
Cote d'Ivoire 
Ethiopia 
Gambia, The 
Guinea 
Kenya 
Madagascar 
Medium Human Development Countries (0.5 ~ HDI < 0.8) 
East Asia and Pacific 
China 
Fiji 
Indonesia 
Lao People's Dem. Rep. 
Mongolia 
Myanmar 
Papua New Guinea 
Philippines 
Solomon Islands 
Thailand 
Vietnam 
Europe and Central Asia 
Albania 
Azerbaijan 
Belarus 
Georgia 
Kazakhstan 
Kyrgyzstan 
Moldova, Rep. of 
Russian Federation 
Tajikistan 
Turkey 
Ukraine 
Latin America and Caribbean 
Belize 
Bolivia 
Brazil 
Colombia 
Dominican Republic 
Ecuador 
El Salvador 
Guatemala 
Guyana 
Honduras 
Jamaica 
Nicaragua 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Venezuela 
Middle East and North Africa 
Algeria 
Egypt 
Iran, Islamic Rep. of 
Jordan 
Lebanon 
Morocco 
Syrian Arab Republic 
Tunisia 
Malawi 
Mali 
Mauritania 
Mozambique 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Rwanda 
Senegal 
Sierra Leone 
Tanzania, U. Rep. of 
South Asia 
Bangladesh 
India 
Pakistan 
Sri Lanka 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Botswana 
Comoros 
Congo, Rep. of 
Ghana 
Guinea-Bissau 
Lesotho 
South Africa 
Sudan 
Swaziland 
Togo 
Uganda 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
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Appendix III: Aid and PPE Regressions 
(1) (2)
 
Dependent = UPPE/GDP Dependent = BPPE/GDP
 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
Constant 6.506*** 22.030 0.901 *** 19.591 
(0.295) (0.046) 
AidlGDP -0.035 -1.617 -0.007* -2.016 
(0.022) (0.003) 
Adjusted R2 0.004 0.008 
f-statistic 2.614 4.065 
N 378 378 
Note: *Significant at the 5-percent level, **Significant at the I-percent level, and 
***Significant at the O.I-percent level. Numbers in parenthesis represent standard 
errors for each coefficient. All variables measured as natural logs. 
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Appendix IV: First-Stage Regression with Individual Policy Variables 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic 
Constant 18.491 *** 17.057 
(1.056) 
Population -0.530*** -9.402 
(0.056) 
Egypt 1.604*** 4.157 
(0.386) 
GDPO/capita -1.389*** -18.195 
(0.076) 
Inflation 0.204 1.823 
(0.112) 
Openness/GDP 0.005 1.967 
(0.003) 
Budget/GDP -0.010 0.556 
(0.016) 
Adjusted R2 0.796 
[-statistic 104.927 
N 168 
Note: "Significant at the 5-percent level, 
*"Significant at the I-percent level, and 
**"Significant at the a.l-percent level. Numbers 
in parenthesis represent standard errors for each 
coefficient. All variables except Egypt, 
Openness/GDP, and Budget/GDP are measured 
as natural logs. 
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